Multilevel Access Control


Multilevel access control models combine several of the access control models.

  • Used when simpler access control models aren’t robust enough
  • Used by military and government

The Bell-LaPadula Model

The Bell-LaPadula model implements a combination of discretionary and mandatory access controls (DAC and MAC) and is primarily concerned with the confidentiality of the resource in question.

  • generally, MAC takes precedence over DAC
  • two security models define how information can flow to and from the resource
    • The Simple Security Property
      • level of access granted to an individual must be at least as high as the classification of the resource in order for the individual to access it
      • summarized as no read up
    • The * Property (Star Property)
      • anyone accessing a resource can only write (or copy) its contents to another resource classified at the same level or higher
      • “no write down”
    • The Discretionary Security Property
      • requires use of an access matrix to enforce discretionary access control

The Biba Model

The Biba model of access control is primarily concerned with protecting the integrity of data, even at the expense of confidentiality.

  • more important to keep people from altering it than viewing it
  • 2 security rules that govern
    • exact opposite of Bell-LaPadula
    • The Simple Integrity Axiom
      • The level of access granted to an individual must be no lower than the classification of the resource.
      • Access to one level does not grant access to lower levels
      • no read down
    • The * Integrity Axiom (Star Integrity Axiom)
      • Anyone accessing a resource can only write its contents to a resource classified at the same level or lower
      • no write up

The Brewer and Nash Model

The Brewer and Nash model, aka Chinese Wall model, is an access control model designed to prevent conflicts of interest.

  • considers the subject’s recent history and the roles the subject is fulfilling
  • used in industries with sensitive data
    • financial, medical, legal
  • 3 main resource classes:
    • Objects: Resources, such as files or information, pertaining to a single organization
    • Company groups: All objects pertaining to an organization
    • Conflict classes: All groups of objects concerning competing parties

Example

Commercial Law Firm

  • firm represents competing individuals and companies
  • individual lawyer needs has access to files for multiple clients, that could cause conflict of interest
  • so with this model, the level of access dynamically changes based on the materials previously accessed

Clark-Wilson Model

The Clark-Wilson model considers three things together as a set: the subject, the object, and the kind of transaction the subject is requesting to perform upon the object.

  • requires a matrix that allows only transaction types against objects to be performed by a limited set of trusted subjects

Noninterference Models

Noninterference models use security domains (sets of subjects) such that members in one domain cannot interfere with (interact with) members in “another domain.”

  • e.g., Gogun-Meseguer

Graham-Denning Model

The Graham-Denning model uses a matrix to define allowable boundaries or sets of actions involved with the secure creation, deletion and control of subjects, and the ability to control assignment of access rights.